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The Global “War on Terror” and the
Tenuous Public Space of Muslims in
Latin America and the Caribbean
Ken Chitwood
1 On 31 October, 2017 the FBI surmises that Uzbeki national Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov
drove a rented truck into cyclists and runners along the Hudson River Park bike path in
Lower Manhattan, New York. Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya took responsibility for the attack in
its  newsletter,  al-Naba,  and claimed Saipov as  one of  their  own — a “soldier  of  the
Caliphate” who responded to its  call  to attack “citizens of  the Crusader countries.”
Eight people were killed. Eleven more were severely injured. Those killed included five
Argentines.
2 This attack was framed by news outlets as a salvo in the global “War on Terror” and
cast against the backdrop of previous “terror attacks” in the region. Responding to the
attack and the loss of Argentine lives, President Mauricio Macri said the attack hit all
Argentines  hard  and  that  “there  is  no  place  for  gray  areas”  in  the  fight  against
terrorism.1 Macri won the Argentine presidency in 2015 and ran on a platform that
included a firm stance against “radical terror.” This stance was not only part of the
broader  U.S.-led  global  “War  on  Terror,”  but  drew  on  specific  specters  from
Argentinia’s own past — specifically the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual
Association (AMIA), in which eighty-five people were killed. Indeed, some news outlets
highlighted how the  truck attack  was  the  “deadliest  attack  in  NYC since  9/11”2 or
inflected how Argentina, “Home to Deadliest Jihad in Hemisphere Before 9/11, [was]
Struck Again in NYC.”3 Along with flowers and candles at the makeshift memorial set-
up at Chambers and West Streets, there also hung an Argentine flag and football jersey.
“STOP TERRORISM” was scrawled on one of the temporary barriers put in place as a
means to improve the bike path’s safety.
3 Keeping these attacks and reactions in mind, this essay explores the many linkages
between the Americas and the concept of the global “War on Terror.” Focusing on cases
in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  but  also  drawing  on  broader  currents  in  the
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Americas as a whole, this essay examines how Muslims occupy a tenuous space in the
Latin American and Caribbean public spheres amidst the global “War on Terror” and its
attendant fears,  politics,  and state actions.  It  will  include an overview of  how both
global and local narratives inform how Muslims are viewed in each country and how
two separate attacks — each with their own origins and implications — are now caught
up in a much larger narrative as part of the global “War on Terror.” 
 
1. The Global “War on Terror,” U.S. Politics, Media, and
the Americas
4 While the U.S. has been involved in “fighting terrorism”4 over the last thirty to forty
years in places as diverse as Kenya, Iran, Afghanistan, and Colombia, it was not until
after 9/11 that the “War on Terror” — or global “War on Terror”5 — took on its present
amorphous shape. Since its inception, and by definition, the global “War on Terror” is
international in scope and untraditional in the ways that it constitutes war. This means
that it has expanded the U.S. government’s imperial reach and justified myriad actions
that would have been considered out of bounds in previous engagements (for example
the killing of U.S. citizen Anwar Al-Alawki in Yemen via a drone strike) and in places
where the U.S. is not formally “at war.” Although the geography of this war is focused
on the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Central Asia, it has also included in its
landscape countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, Europe, and Latin America.6
5 The rationale for this global conflict is that since terrorism is a worldwide problem —
both in origin and outcome — so too must  be  the response.  Michael  Chandler  and
Rohan Gunaratna wrote, “[t]he roots of extremism that translate into the threat posed
today by transnational terrorism run much deeper and have to be confronted globally,
at  every  level  of  the  problem.”7 Imagining  the  threat  as  mobile  and  transnational
— what has been called “network terrorism”8 — the U.S. government has justified its
far-reaching actions by citing how terrorists are no longer limited to nation-states like
Afghanistan or Iraq, but that they threaten and violate the sovereignty of each and
every nation. For evidence of this networked and intercontinental terrorist threat they
cite attacks in France, California, and Nigeria. They also look to examples from Latin
America and the Caribbean,  such as  those we will  discuss  in the remainder of  this
article. 
6 The rationale for this war also draws on the “clash of civilizations” thesis of Samuel P.
Huntington, among others.9 Huntington proposed his thesis in response to his pupil
Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man10 and made the case
that peoples’ religious and cultural identities will be the primary source of conflict in
the world following the end of the Cold War. Huntington argued that wars would not be
fought between countries per se, but between cultures. Among these, Islamic cultures
and their extreme expressions would pose the most serious threat to world peace. This
theory has led to a range of policies, actions, and political perspectives which openly
target Muslims and those associated with them. In this drama, “Muslims have been cast
as  subaltern  citizens  in  the  West”  both  ideologically  and  systematically  through
“xenophobic state policies, new citizenship regimes, and racial and religious profiling”
in the post-9/11 world and in the “global context of the U.S.-led ‘War on Terror.’”11
Indeed, as can be gleaned from the concrete details and commentary before,  “[t]he
hegemonic discourses framing [the War on Terror] have been about the security of the
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American  nation  and  consequently  of  all  Western  nations  [including  the  American
hemisphere as a whole]. This discourse of bringing security and peace to the world was
deployed as a moral prop by many Western states for legitimating massive killings of
people of colour overseas and the draconian policies targeting Muslims of colour within
the nations of the West.”12
7 This war is said to have fronts in Latin America and the Caribbean as well. To be fair,
there  have  been  attacks  in  the  region  including  the  aforementioned  incident  in
Argentina in the 1990s among others. Furthermore, in March 2018 Raúl Gutiérrez — a
Cuban national — was arrested in Colombia on suspicion of planning “to kill American
diplomats  on  behalf  of  Islamic  State  (ISIS)  extremists  in  the  nation’s  capital  of
Bogotá.”13 In part because of these plots and attacks U.S. politicians, popular media, and
military leaders have increasingly come to see Latin America as part of the landscape of
their global “War on Terror.”
8 For example, in the run up to the 2012 U.S. Presidential election there was a Republican
Primary debate, which focused on national security and foreign policy. Referring to the
Triple Frontier region — a tri-border area along the junction of Paraguay, Argentina,
and Brazil, where the Iguazú and Paraná rivers converge14 — candidate Mitt Romney
surmised  that  the  supposed  actions  of  Hezbollah  — a  Lebanon-based  Shi’i  Islamist
political party and perceived terrorist group — in that region “pose a very significant
and imminent threat  to  the United States.”15 Without  any cited evidence the other
Republican  candidates  echoed  Romney  in  quick  succession.  Rick  Perry  from  Texas
called for a renewed “twenty-first century Monroe Doctrine” to oppose radical Islamist
incursions in the Americas and former senator Rick Santorum added, “I’ve spent a lot
of  time…[thinking]  about  what’s  going  on  in  Central  and  South  America.  I’m  very
concerned  about  the  militant  socialists  and  the  radical  Islamists  joining  together,
bonding  together.”16 Four  years  later,  Donald  Trump’s  presidential  campaign  and
cabinet  staff  again  rang  the  alarm  about  “sleeper  cells”  and  imminent  Hezbollah
threats  in  Latin  America.  Gen.  John  Kelly  — originally  Mr.  Trump’s  Director of
Homeland Security and later his White House Chief of Staff — warned of a web of terror
in South America coming from Shi’i and Sunni sources. However, as an article in The
Nation pointed out, if these cells do exist then they must be “the sleepiest of sleeper
cells.”17 Nonetheless, it seems that U.S. politicians and presidential hopefuls see Latin
America as a front in the “War on Terror” and have hinted at being willing to bring
military force to bear on the situation and stem the tide of terror as it laps against the
shores of their hemisphere.
9 The  invocation  of  the  “Monroe  Doctrine”  is  especially  relevant  to  this  article’s
discussion. Beginning in 1823, the U.S. government wanted to prevent the incursion of
European powers in the American hemisphere — what they saw as the young nation’s
own backyard. Since then, and even before, events in Latin America and the Caribbean
have  been  concerns  of  U.S.  national  and  foreign  policy.  There  have  been different
specters  hovering  off  the  shores  of  the  Americas  in  the  minds  of  U.S.  politicians
— European  powers,  Marxist  influences,  Nazis,  the  Socialist-Communist,  or  other
threats to U.S. economic and political interests in the region. At times, this has resulted
in direct, and sometimes prolonged, military intervention and presence. While not an
exhaustive list, the U.S. has involved itself in Puerto Rico (1898), Panama (1903-1914,
1989), the Dominican Republic (1903, 1905, 1916-1924, 1965-1967), Mexico (1905, 1917),
Cuba (1906-1909, 1912, 1961), Honduras (1907), Nicaragua (1909, 1912-1925, 1926-1933,
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1984),  Haiti  (1915-1934),  Grenada  (1983),  and  Guatemala  (1966,  1982-1983).  The
justification for these interventions was based on the premise that if foreign powers
(for  example,  Europeans,  Nazis,  Communists)  gained  a  foothold  in  the  Americas  it
would endanger the peace, economic success,  and political power of the U.S. in the
region. U.S. politicians assumed their “partners” in Latin America and the Caribbean
would not act as willful agents and choose such systems or ideologies, and thus the U.S.
could assume that the introduction of ideas and systems contrary to their design in the
region were tantamount to a foreign invasion and thus illegitimate.18 This is, at least in
part how the U.S. viewed their intervention as an obligation or duty to their regional
“partners.” From the perspective of U.S. policy, these were unwanted foreign powers
threatening  the  welfare  of  their  Latin  American  and  Caribbean  neighbors  and  by
extension the U.S. itself. The Monroe Doctrine helped first articulate this perspective
and it  remains  a  fundamental  premise  that  could  justify  U.S.  military  intervention
down to the present.19
10 While the U.S. has not proposed any direct military intervention in the region as a
result of the global “War on Terror,” the rhetoric of presidential candidates and some
elected officials reflects a readiness to justify U.S. intervention in Latin American and
Caribbean affairs in order to protect the region from the threat of the supposed foreign
terrorist. The problem is, there is little to no verifiable evidence of large numbers of
terror  cells  or  violent-extremist  organizations  in  the  region.  As  R.  Guy  Emerson
reflected, it is also possible that the “War on Terror” foreign-policy paradigm of the
George W. Bush administration exacerbated a geostrategic disconnect between states in
Latin America and the U.S. government.20 While I believe that there are states who are
geostrategically allied with the “War on Terror” discourse and outlook, Emerson does
well to point out how the Bush administration’s interamerican relations were in many
ways conformed to a broader “War on Terror” model.  There is  further evidence to
show how the global “War on Terror” has shaped U.S. postures toward their neighbors
to the South. In a research report for the Air Force Fellows Curtis C. Connell admitted
that  while  there  is  not  “a  profound and deep history of  Islamic  terrorism in  Latin
America  and  the  Caribbean”  U.S.  policy  makers  should  remain  vigilant  concerning
“Islamic fundamentalists activities in the region” because of “a more recent history of
Islamic  fundamentalists’  support  activities.”21 In  particular,  he  referenced  the  “Tri-
Border Area (TBA) between Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, which will be explored in
more detail below.
11 Certain sectors of the have also traded in speculation about, and influenced popular
and  political  views  concerning,  terror  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  — most
poignantly in the Trump era. In an op-ed for The Miami Herald Robert Singer — CEO
and  Executive  Vice  President  of  the  World  Jewish  Congress  — warned  of  letting
terrorist groups fester in the region. He wrote of Hezbollah in particular that it “poses a
serious danger to the entire civilized world” and it must be stopped “from building its
strategic  base  in  Central  and  South  America.”22 Furthermore,  “the  international
community…must do everything possible to make sure that the Western Hemisphere
does not become the next terrorist battleground.” Others chimed in and suggested that
the  Trump  administration  should  target,  "Hezbollah’s  Latin  American  operations”
specifically  the  "convergence  of  Iran-sponsored  radical  Islam  with  transnational
organized crime in Latin America is a serious threat to the national security of the
United States,  especially  in the tri-border area,  or  TBA…”23 Furthermore,  citing the
Grantham report for the National Center for Policy Analysis — a conservative American
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think-tank — Fox News led with a story about how “the growth of Islamic extremist
activity in Latin America is a major security threat to our country. And Iran’s influence
in  Latin  America  demands  a  new  national  security  strategy  in  the  region.”24 The
Grantham report, for its part, warned that “Islamists are organized, well-funded and
operating sophisticated operations against the United States only a few hundred miles
south of our border.”25 Amidst this media fury over the threat of terror "south of our
border,” even those who believe that the threat is relatively low leave the door open
and  state  that  an  attack  based  out  of  Latin  America  or  the  Caribbean  is  not  only
“possible;  it  may  even  be  likely.”  Writing  for  the  Christian  Science  Monitor  Latin
Americanist  Christopher  Sabatini  wrote  that  the  government  should,  “consolidate
cooperation in the region” to “improve US security from radical Islam, from any source
and from any region.”26 All of these media speculations not only fan the flame of fear in
the general public, but also make suggestions in regards to the policies and positions of
U.S. officials and government leaders.
12 Two political cartoons also help tell this tale. The first, from October 2008, features an
unfurled Mexican flag. Pulling back on the red portion on the bottom right-hand side of
the flag is a turbaned and long-bearded individual who is made to look like a Taliban
“terrorist” replete with menacing scowl and a lit-bomb in his hand and a kalishnikov
rifle slung across his back.27 He is a labeled, “JIHAD.” Beyond drawing on Orientalist and
Islamophobic stereotypes and motifs (modeled largely off the Taliban), this cartoon is
meant  to  illustrate  how  jihadism is  skulking  in  the  background  of  Latin  American
nations. The other political cartoon from January 2017 shows two similarly stereotyped
representations of  the “Muslim terrorist” with bomb-in-hand and turban-on-head.28
This time, they are in the desert (signified by sandstone rocks and saguaro cacti) and
being led by a “coyote” — a popular term for a people smuggler — across the U.S./
Mexico border.  The terrorists comment to one another,  “don’t  worry,  they are still
debating the immigration bill.” Here, two hyper-nationalist policy concerns of the U.S.
converge — immigration and terrorism.
13 The  convergence  of  these  two  fears  — that  of  the  brown  terrorist  and  the  brown
Latina/o  coming  from  the  south  to  invade  the  U.S. —  have  had  an  impact  in  U.S.
politics.  Not  only  do  we  see  the  evidence  of  this  in  the  primaries  of  the  2012
Presidential election, but also in 2016 and the election of Donald Trump. He evinced a
hard line on both. Far from fringe conspiracy theory, the two-pronged fear has given
rise to a groundswell of voters who feel — like the authors quoted before — that the
U.S. is under threat through a combination of potent perils. In this discourse, the fear
of  terrorists  coming  across  the  border  amplifies  an  already  potent  racialized
conception of the U.S.-Mexico border. The primary cause for the concern at the border
is the fear that many in the U.S. have about Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and
other immigrants. While terrorism is not the chief concern, it is added to the mix as
more  evidence  in  the  case  against  “open borders.”  Related  to  this  is  the  fear  that
“narco-traffickers” and “jihadists” will start to work together to threaten U.S. security
at the borders.29 While this has yet to be translated into concrete policy, it is part of a
broader spectrum of anti-immigrant rhetoric and illustrates a confluence of fears in
U.S. politics and discussions around immigration.
14 These beliefs are undergirded by reports in the media that terror and terrains to the
south are related in dangerous terms. For example, CNN falsely reported that there was
a photo of the world-famous and popular Igauzu Falls found at an Al-Qaeda training
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camp  in  Afghanistan.30 The  media  also  regularly  draws  connections  between  Latin
America and jihadist terror by invoking as many examples as they can and blaming the
ability of terror to spread to the Americas via pathways in the south on things such as
Venezuela’s  socialist  government,  the  region’s  “horrendous  prison  system,”  or  its
“porous  borders,  transnational  criminal  organizations,  sophisticated  smuggling
networks  and  the  dubious  ability  of  Latin  American  governments  to  detect  and
intercept terrorists.”31 Unfortunately,  there is  scant evidence that so-called “radical
Islamists” are lurking in the shadows of Latin America and the Caribbean or scurrying
back-and-forth across the borders between the U.S. and the global south.32 If there are
any, they have yet to make a significant impression or commit any attacks.
15 Even so, this has not stopped politicians, sectors of the media, and members of the
military from discussing the potential, proposing policy, and advocating action to be
taken against what they perceive as an imminent “threat.” This new geography and
iconography of terror that constructs Muslims as the “other” amidst the global “War
on Terror” has extended its grip into Latin America and the Caribbean. In fact, some of
the first extensive academic research in English on Islam and Muslim communities in
Latin America and the Caribbean was carried out as part of the strategic training of U.S.
military officials. Building off congressional hearings, first-hand research, demographic
data,  news media,  and other  publications  these  reports  have tried to  highlight  the
“complex interdependence”33 of  state and non-state actors between the Middle East
and Latin America and “determine whether U.S. national security interests should be
more concerned about radical Islamic influence and support in Latin America and the
Caribbean.”34 Tracing the trajectories of various groups — from Hezbollah to Al-Qaeda
to ISIS — these reports have come to differing conclusions. While one suggested that
“the potential threat presented to the security of the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere
from radical Islamic actors is serious and requires sustained attention from leaders in
the region”35 another felt that “a mild level of concern” was justified, “but perhaps not
to the heightened threat that some have suggested.”36 Or, in other words, “keep your
eyes on it, but don’t overrate it.”37 Despite this caution, it has been the former opinion
— that of  an imminent and dangerous threat — that has dominated the media and
political discussion surrounding the amalgamation of terror and the Latin American
and Caribbean regions. 
16 This has led to the aforementioned “xenophobic state policies, new citizenship regimes,
and racial and religious profiling” that Zine mentioned. From the Bahamas to Puerto
Rico, Brazil to Mexico, Muslims across the Americas have felt the pressure of policies
and public opinion bearing down on them. As Jerusa Ali wrote of Muslims in Brazil,
“daily acts of religious expression,  such as prayer,  covering,  and reciting in Arabic,
have  been  reinscribed  as  suspicious  and  association  with  the  acts  of  terrorists,  a
perspective  reified by the media.”38 Furthermore,  in  the wake of  9/11 the Mexican
government increased security pressure and surveillance on the mosques and Muslim
organizations in Mexico City and throughout the country.  The effect  has been that
Arabs  and Muslims — no matter  their  long-term presence in  the various  countries
under consideration — have been conflated with terror.39 
17 This point is underlined when situated within the U.S.’s historical role in the region.
Similar to the ways that the U.S.  heavily influenced the region with its geo-politics
concerning  European  incursion  or  Communism  so  too  the  American-led  “War  on
Terror” and its power-knowledge nexus has swayed how Latin American and Caribbean
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states approach the idea of terrorism or frame Islam and Muslim communities in their
own  countries  and  contexts.  While  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  has  its  own
Orientalist  past  that  colors  their  treatment  of  the  topic  of  Islam  and  Muslims,
contemporary U.S. influence has stoked and fanned its flames. Edward Said introduced
the idea of Orientalism through his publication of the same name in 1978, in which he
probed the idea of the East and West as imagined antitheses to one another, through
which  the  European  West  sought  to  dominate  the  “Orient”  through  a  particular
production  of  knowledge  that  posited  that  European  identity  was  a  progressive
superior to the exotic and static “Orient.”40 Although the concept of Orientalism was
first applied to Europe’s relations with the East, other regions such as Latin America
have come under consideration and birthed new interpretations of what Orientalism is
and how it  operates.  While  there  is  disagreement  about  the  degree  to  which Latin
American and Caribbean power and knowledge regimes are “Orientalist,”41 the region
shares  a  long history of  “other-ing” the Moor during Spanish colonization and the
“Turco”  immigrant  from  the  19th-century  onward  in  law,  literature,  and  society.42
Because of this, Muslim and Middle Eastern voices have often been marginalized and
existed as “subaltern” groups in Latin American and Caribbean society. With that said,
they have been able to find some voice in regimes that often free up political space for
diverse subjects in an effort to differentiate themselves from European colonizers, but
also from their indigenous pasts. Thus, in some way the Muslim and the Middle Eastern
immigrants act as a kind of “middleman” minority in Latin American and Caribbean
contexts.43
18 All the same, because of the U.S.’s ability to sway Latin American and Caribbean politics
and society through its foreign-policy emphases and global paradigms, Latin American
Orientalism has been stoked along the way by its visions and vocabularies about Islam
and Muslims. During the global “War on Terror,” for example, the latent Orientalist
fears of the “Turco" in Latin America or of the Muslim threat in the Caribbean have
been configured so as to cast Islam and all Muslims as alien, exotic, and menacing. This
dynamic will be underlined through the three examples to follow. 
 
2. The Question of Salafism, Jamaat al-Muslimeen,
and Islam in Trinidad
19 As much as ISIS is based in places such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya it still has transnational
reach in its appeal, impact, and recruitment. One thing the global “War on Terror” has
right  is  that  jihadist  Salafist  groups  like  ISIS  are  able  to  operate  across  national
boundaries and extend their  influence across the globe.  Beyond its  claimed foreign
attacks  in  Paris,  London,  New  York,  and  other  Western  city-centers  ISIS  was  also
effective with recruitment of foreign fighters via agitprop and social media outreach.
The top five countries they were able to recruit from include Tunisia, Saudi Arabia,
Russia,  Turkey,  and Jordan.44 This  is  in  terms of  sheer  numbers.  When it  comes to
recruitment per capita among the Muslim population of respective countries, the top
percentage  of  recruits  comes  from Finland,  Ireland,  Belgium,  Sweden,  Austria,  and
Trinidad and Tobago.45 This has led to speculation, and widespread concern, about the
supposed rise of Salafism and radical jihadism among Trinidadian Muslims. With titles
like, “ISIS in the Caribbean” and “Caribbean to Caliphate” several online news portals
and print newspapers and magazines picked up on these numbers and began to report
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on the apparition of terror in Trinidad.46 There have been 89-125 Trinidadians total
who reported for duty with ISIS.47 An article in The Atlantic pointed a finger at “the
spread of Salafi Islam in the country” as one of the prime push factors for the departing
fighters.48 This fear of the rise of jihadi-Salafism has led to Trinidadian Muslims being
placed on terror “watch lists” and Caribbean Salafi scholars being detained across the
globe.49
20 Salafism in Trinidad,  let  alone elsewhere,  cannot be viewed as a  “monolithic set  of
radical  Islamic  doctrines...implacably  dedicated  to  violence”50 but  instead  must  be
understood according to further categories of delineation or a spectrum of opinion and
implementation in multifarious contexts.51 The vast majority would be categorized as
"purist"  or  "quietest"  according to  Wiktorowicz’s  categories.52 Their  strength is  not
drawn from direct engagement with society, but a strategic withdrawal. 53As Mohamed-
Ali Adraoui wrote, “the appeal of Salafi puritanism lies in its ability to provide a way of
not only opting out of society but creating an alternative, superior community based on
the unity of God.”54 This notion of withdrawal — or what Terje Østebø calls a “politics of
withdrawal”55 — is particularly salient when considering Salafis in Trinidad.
21 Amidst the structural changes that occurred in Trinidad across the last several decades
and  in  the  wake  of  post-colonialism  and  immigration,  new  discourses  focused  on
reform  at  the  local,  national,  and  global  levels  have  created  fresh  ideological
orientations  among  Muslims  in  the  nation.  These  reform  movements  focus  on  an
individualization and politicization of religious purity and a reconfiguring of authority.
And so, some point the finger at poverty among Afro-Trinidadian Muslims as a reason
for the rise in Salafism and for prompting the joining of groups such as ISIS. Al-Jazeera
quoted Imam Yasin Abu Bakr, the leader of Jamaat al-Muslimeen, as saying that Afro-
Trinidadian Muslims are motivated to join ISIS because of their marginalization from
society. He said, “they just sit in the ghetto and do nothing. And then drugs come in
and it’s a haven for the drugs. And now the guns are in and so the murder rate is just
spiraling out of control.”56 
22 Jamaat  al-Muslimeen  started  as  a  local  Islamic  group  advocating  for  justice  and
reformation of Islamic religious life in the country. It drew its support from the ranks
of urban Afro-Trinidadian poor in Port of Spain rather than among Syrian or South
Asian Muslims in the country. Abu Bakr is a former police officer who resigned in 1968
and who converted to Islam in Canada. He returned to Trinidad with the aim of setting
up Islamic da’wa, or mission, with urban youth. Drawing inspiration from the Nation of
Islam and, by proxy, the Black Power Movement in the U.S. and the wider Caribbean
Abu Bakr wanted to create a community set apart, which would empower its members
and correct the wrongs of the wider society. And so, set apart a community he did.
They set-up a compound on the outskirts of Port of Spain that included communal
farming, shared resources, polygamous marriages, women in hijabs or full veils, and an
overwhelmingly  Afro-Trinidadian  vibe  among  its  members  despite  the  presence  of
some Indo-Trinidadian youth and young adults.57
23 On the one hand, their withdrawal is  an empowering move to join with other like-
minded brethren. On the other hand, it signals a struggle to fit in with a society that
seems to not accept you for who you are. In the case of Jamaat al-Muslimeen it also
speaks  to  the  underlying  racial  tensions  that  Afro-Trinidadian  Muslims  face  when
compared  to  their  Indo-Trinidadian  counterparts.  Although  withdrawal  gives  them
some power, the members of Jamaat al-Muslimeen and Salafi groups in Trinidad (and
The Global “War on Terror” and the Tenuous Public Space of Muslims in Latin A...
Hamsa, 5 | 2019
8
those  who are  attracted to them) would rather  recognition and respect  in  broader
Trinidadian society. Lacking this, they withdraw or in some instances join the ranks of
jihadist foreign fighters abroad. The son of the founder — Fuad — warned that while
politicians may want to minimize or ignore this issue, the problem persists and grows
larger. While certainly implicated in international currents of Salafism, jihadi violence,
and the global “War on Terror” the previously cited articles also point to the very local 
issues that may motivate Trinidadian Muslims to travel and join ISIS’s fight in Syria,
Iraq, and elsewhere.
24 As we saw in the previous section, the link between Islam and terrorism is a major
political,  media,  and  military  concern,  especially  since  9/11.  This  discourse  has,
according  to  Mahmood  Mamdani,  “turned  religious  experience  into  a  political
category, differentiating ‘good Muslims’ from ‘bad Muslims’ rather than terrorists from
civilians.”58 In no uncertain terms, Mamdani made clear that this leads to an attempted
exorcism of Islamic threats and “bad Muslims” such as Salafis. This approach avoids
historical  contextualization  and  local  issues  and  instead  judges  the  situation  on
preconceived,  boilerplate,  benchmarks  and  biases.  It  follows,  then,  that  analysts,
researchers, and government officials are precluded from being able to see the practice
of  Islam as  inherently  intertwined with local  issues  surrounding gender,  class,  and
other  areas  of  social  justice  and  societal  concern.  Thus,  before  jumping  to  any
conclusions,  it  behooves  us  to  pay  attention  to  what  is  going  on  in  Trinidad  and
understand the perceived increase in Salafism and ability  for  ISIS  to  recruit  in the
country within that country’s particular historical and social context.
25 Trinidad and Tobago has one of the largest Muslim populations in the Caribbean —
around 78,000  or  6  per  cent  of  the  population  — and  is  at  times  seriously  divided
between  Asian  immigrant  communities  and  Afro-Trinidadian  convert  communities.
Muslims on the island also live under the shadow of the 1990 Jamaat al-Muslimeen coup
attempt,  which  ended  after  six  days.  Almost  three  decades  later,  “its  memory  has
tarnished the image of  the islands’  Muslim community”59 and suspicion for various
threats and trends is laid at the organization’s — or the wider Muslim community’s —
feet. For example, in 2011 the Trinidadian government declared a state of emergency
following a  spike  in  violent  crime in  Port  of  Spain — the nation’s  capital  — and a
possible assassination plot against then-Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar. Several
members of  the Afro-Trinidadian community were detained,  including Abu Sa’d at-
Trinidadi, who would later rise to prominence via an interview in Dabiq,60 ISIS’s now
defunct online magazine.61 There was never any proof of their involvement and they
never claimed to be planning the plot, but the suspicions linger. Even some scholars
have jumped on the bandwagon of blame and accused the recruitment of ISIS fighters
in Trinidad to “links with organized crime” (supposedly via Jamaat al-Muslimeen) and
not  to  structural  issues  such  as  “tangible  discrimination  or  lack  of  opportunity.”62
While  such  structural  issues  impact  large  groups  of  people  across  the  globe  — the
majority of which do not claim allegiance to any terror groups — it is important to pay
attention to such issues when considering any minority resistance movement, Islamic
or otherwise. Not doing so in this instance means the lack of a serious engagement with
the story of Jamaat al-Muslimeen and their own experiences, efforts, and exploits over
the years in the Trinidadian context.
26 Much  of  the  discourse  surrounding  Jamaat  al-Muslimeen  circles  back  to  their
attempted coup in 1990. On 27 July 1990 a group of men from the group stormed the
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parliament in Port of Spain and a prominent television station and announced a new
state based on a program of Islamic reform. Included among their hostages was the
then-Prime Minister of Trinidad, A.N.R. Robinson and fifteen of his colleagues. From
the station, Abu Bakr went to television and announced a popular people’s revolution
against the austerity measures and perceived injustices of the Robinson government.63
He cautioned the populace to not loot or destroy property. However, his warnings were
ignored  and  mass  looting  and  arson  was  unleashed  soon  after  the  announcement.
Despite their strong hand and six-day holdout, Robinson and his government did not
give into the group’s demands and they started to lose control of the coup.64 Jamaat al-
Muslimeen then made an agreement with the government and surrendered. Twenty-
four Trinidadians had died.
27 The coup was framed as part  of  a  fundamentalist  Islamic “holy war” in the media,
which was exacerbated by the disillusionment and rage of AK-47 toting black young
men  who  saw  in  Islam  — and  in  their  leader  Abu  Bakr —  a  play  at  power  and
prominence in Trinidadian society.65 In reality, the coup was predicated by a number of
factors. Chris Searle argued that “Trinidad and Tobago presents a stark example of a
recently decolonized nation that moved from relative underdevelopment to a form of
superficial  prosperity  — due  to  the  extraction  and  export  of  one  particular  raw
material (petroleum)…only to be plunged back into poverty and dependence when the
price of that raw material fell on the world market.”66 There were also tensions over
religious freedom to blame.
28 Just days before the attempted coup, Jamaat al-Muslimeen had lost a legal battle over
their land in Port of Spain. While Eric Williams, the first Prime Minister of Trinidad,
had bequeathed the land to Abu Bakr, the Robinson government had surveilled Jamaat
al-Muslimeen  and  accused  them  of  squatting  on  the  land  and  being  involved  in
organized crime. The Muslimeen, in turn, accused the government of harassment and
false accusations.67 The attempted coup must be seen against this backdrop more than
any “global holy war.” For the members of the Muslimeen the coup, “represented a
spark of resistance and hope of a way forward during a period when the community
seemed rudderless and devoid of progressive leadership.”68 The investigation into the
coup never officially ended and Abu Bakr “continues to be a controversial figure and he
and his group continue to be regarded as a threat to law and order in Trinidad and
Tobago.”69 His group, however, continue to live together separately in their compound,
largely isolated from broader Trinidadian society.70 While the compound is tolerated by
the government, it is still held in contempt and suspicion because of its isolation and
because of the 1990 coup. Furthermore, members of Jamaat al-Muslimeen have always
expressed a desire for their movement to be integrated more fully into its  cultural
environment in Trinidad.
29 Despite a general lack of evidence pointing to Jamaat al-Muslimeen members joining
ISIS (in fact, it is reported that recruitment is coming from Rio Claro in the southeast,
Chaguanas  in  central  Trinidad,71 and  Diego  Martin,  a  small  town  north  of  Port  of
Spain)72 the coup in 1990 is linked together with 9/11, ISIS, and the global “War on
Terror.” While there may be some shared motivation and even a shared ideology in
Salafism,  the  various  events  and  exploits  noted  before  are  diverse,  contradictory,
ambivalent in relationship, and fragmented. In fact, Meijer pointed out how Salafism,
for  all  its  emphasis  on  unity,  clarity,  quiet  activism,  and  universalism,  is  still
undermined by regional fractures and hot-points of conflict dictated by local concerns
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and cues.73 Even if Jamaat al-Muslimeen should be considered a jihadi-Salafi movement,
which I do not think is the best category to apply, it is important to “attempt to locate
jihadism  in  local,  national,  and  regional  contexts”  so  as  to  have  an  “‘inside-out’
perspective which can act as a corrective to those discussions of global jihadism which
have been limited to identifying”74 how global actors (for example, Al Qaeda and ISIS)
are exerting influence across the world. While they certainly have a role to play, it is
the politics of marginalization, withdrawal, and recognition in Trinidadian society that
seemed to exert the greatest influence on this group of Afro-Trinidadian Muslims.
30 In the end, whether it be the perception of the media or national governments or the
inducements  of  individual  actors  and  the  transnational  spread  of  ideas,  men,  and
materials for the sake of jihad — the global “War on Terror” — cannot be seen as some
unified, and universalized, global movement. While the aim of the American-led effort
may be a unified global front against terror wherever it is found, the various states and
organizations  that  participate  in  it  may or  may not  comply  with  the  U.S.’s  rubric.
Furthermore, as a term unmoored from its American inflections it can now be used as a
phrase to address various local phenomena. This is seen when state leaders invoke the
global “War on Terror” to address local groups, issues, and problems. Setting a local
issue  within  the  global  “War  on  Terror”  is  meant  to  justify  greater  uses  of  force,
encourage the support of other nation-states, and stoke feelings of a need for unity
against a common enemy. This runs parallel to the ways in which local states invoked
the global struggle against Communism during the Cold War in order to coax broader
support for their local competitions for power. In order to analyze the global “War on
Terror,” properly we must not only recognize its global and amalgamating aspects, but
see how the global and the local are engaged in a dynamic dance of push and pull
factors  and  multifarious  motivations  at  various  registers.  The  example  illustrated
before shows how a Caribbean context (Trinidad) is implicated in, and influenced by,
ISIS’s global war. It also illustrated how the assumptions of the global “War on Terror”
have framed, and continue to influence the interpretation of, what was largely a local
incident — the 1990 coup. The situation is similar for Argentine Muslims in the public
sphere.
 
3. The Tenuous Place of Muslims in Argentina’s Public
Sphere
31 When  President  Mauricio  Macri  made  his  comments  about  committing  to  fight
terrorism “head to toe” he not only had in mind the most recent attacks in New York,
but also two earlier attacks that came to frame the place of Islam and Muslims in the
Argentine public sphere. That place is a tenuous one, to be sure. Although the Muslim
community in Argentina is relatively strong, and has a history stretching back to the
sixteenth  century,  Muslims  still  suffer  from  anti-Arab  sentiment  and  a  storm  of
suspicion swirling around them in relation to attacks on Argentine soil and the broader
discourse of the global “War on Terror.” There is no firm conclusion on the current
number of Muslims in Argentina.75 Despite the inconclusiveness concerning numbers,
Islam came to the foreground of the Argentine public sphere with the election of Carlos
Menem to  the  top  office  in  Argentina.  Born to  Syrian  Muslim immigrants,  Menem
converted to Catholicism in 1966 in hopes of attaining public office.76 Despite his efforts
at showcasing his Catholicism he was regularly labeled during his ten-year presidency
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(1989-1999) a “Turco” and his government was referred to as the “Harem Government.”
The  failure  of  his  governmental  ability  was  then  misappropriated  to  his  Muslim
upbringing by many.
32 This negative view of Muslims was exacerbated by the bombing of the Israeli embassy
in Buenos Aires on 17 March 1990 when twenty-two people were killed. A few years
later, the Jewish Community Center of Buenos Aires was attacked on 18 July 1994 with
eighty-five people being killed and 300 people injured. These two events damaged the
image of Muslims in Argentina. While the physical effects of the bombings left little to
be remembered and there are no visible scars in the city of Buenos Aires, memories of
terror still linger in the air and lead to tension over the place of Muslims in Argentine
culture and public life. The fact that the investigation has not been settled is still a
potent political issue in Argentina.
33 Argentina has a large Jewish population,77 which at 300,000 people is  the largest in
Latin America and has maintained generally positive relations with the nation of Israel
over the years. Hence, some surmise, this has made them a target of Muslim extremists
and pro-Palestinian terror groups.78 Indeed, the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO, also
known as  “Islamic Jihad”)  as  Shi’i  militia  in Lebanon claimed responsibility  for  the
bombing of the Israeli  embassy in 1990.79 However, the investigation into the AMIA
bombing  has  taken  over  twenty  years  and  has  been  mired  in  controversy  and
subterfuge. In 2006, Argentine prosecutors charged eight Iranian government officials
with orchestrating and executing the attack.80 Iranian diplomat Mohesen Rabbani was
singled out for taking lead in planning the bombing. Red alerts were issued by Interpol,
at the behest of the lead prosecutor and prominent member of the Argentine Jewish
community — Alberto Nisman. Nisman claimed his investigation and prosecution were
constantly being hampered by both former president Nestór Kirchner and his wife, and
former president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in exchange for political favors and
economic agreements with Iran. Nisman died due to a bullet wound to the head in his
apartment in January 2015. There is no conclusive evidence to point to whether his
death was  a  suicide,  a  forced suicide,  or  a  murder.  In  September  2017,  there  were
reports that concluded he was murdered, but suspicion and intrigue still swirl around
his death.
34 When Macri ran for President in 2015 he capitalized on the controversy between de
Kirchner and the Nisman case. Riding a wave of popular sentiment that felt “Islamic
fundamentalism”81 was to blame for Nisman’s death and that de Kirchner was working
with Iran to cover up their involvement in the AMIA incident and Nisman’s supposed
assassination, Macri vowed to achieve justice. He also promised to take up the fight
against  “radical  Islam.” After he was elected,  one of  his  first  actions was to void a
“memorandum of understanding” that allowed Iran to undertake its own investigation
of those accused in the AMIA bombing.82 Furthermore, for the first time in twenty-six
years,  the  Argentine  government  took  a  formal  role  in  commemorating  the  AMIA
bombing. What is extraordinary here is not that the Macri government did so, but that
no previous government had done so. Argentina’s Vice President Gabriela Michetti said
at the event, “[t]oday we have decided to remember here, as a symbol that this is a top
priority issue in the government’s human rights agenda.”83 Some commentators have
taken this as evidence of a paradigm shift in Argentine politics and public opinion. And
yet, if we keep the longue durée and broader scope of worldwide political currents in
mind we also see this is in keeping with Argentina’s own long-held Orientalist and anti-
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Arab past.  This  historical  frame of  mind has  only  been exacerbated after  the  1990
attacks and the speculation surrounding them, 9/11, and the the post-ISIS uptick in
tough, and unrelenting, language as part of the global “War on Terror.” 
 
4. Fear and Terror Along the Triple Frontier
35 The nebulous reputation and position of Muslims in Argentina is exacerbated by the
rumors that surround the Triple Frontier region where Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil
meet. As alluded to earlier, this region has been surrounded by speculation as a safe-
haven for foreign terrorists and sleeper cells over the last two to three decades. Rather
than being a place ripe for fear and trembling, it has instead been a place of significant
economic success for many Lebanese immigrants and their families. As I will argue in
this  final  section,  it  is  perhaps a  confluence of  fears  of  terror and a long-lingering
disquiet about frontiers in the Americas that constitutes the qualms about this quarter
of the Latin American landscape.
36 The geographical boundary of the Triple Frontier is set by the confluence of the Paraná
and Iguaçu rivers where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet. There are three cities
connected to each other by bridges across this frontier. In Paraguay is Ciudad del Este,
founded in 1957 as Puerto Presidente Stroessner.  On the other side of the bank of Rio
Paraná lays the Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu bordering Argentine Puerto Iguazu. The
preferred migratory destination for many immigrants has traditionally been either Foz
do Iguaçu or Ciudad del Este since Puerto Iguazu was never fully integrated into the
local economy.84 The area has long been associated with violence, crime, and terrorism.
Instead of being known for economic development, ethnic and religious diversity, and
immigrant  integration  into  the  local  community  the  area  became  known  as  a
“notorious border zone.”85 In fact, in 2019 the entertainment company Netflix released
a blockbuster-style movie about drug trafficking and crime in the area, titled, “Triple
Frontier.”86 Part  of  this  is  surely  associated  to  the  real  threat  associated  with
smuggling, drug trafficking, and other unmonitored trans-border activity in the past.
Still, there is zero firm evidence that the Triple Frontier is presently a “hive of activity”
for terrorist groups. Instead, the media, military, and policy makers have constantly
quoted one another in a “closed loop of self-references” to the effect of producing wild
allegations about Osama Bin Laden’s presence in the area or that, as CNN incorrectly
reported,  that  Al-Qaeda  had  pictures  of  Iguaçu  Falls  hidden  away  in  their  files  in
Afghanistan.87 Even some scholars have contributed to this loop without any adequate
citation  or  proof.88 Connell  reported  to  the  U.S.  Airforce  that,  "the  large  Arab
community in the [Tri-Border Area] is highly conducive to using the region for the
establishment of sleeper cells” and that it features the “largest concentration of Islamic
extremists in Latin America.”89
37 However,  as  Karam  pointed  out,  these  potent  fears  and  estimates  are  overblown.
Instead, an unhealthy dose of anti-Semitism, Orientalism, Islamophobia, and anti-Arab
sentiment has festered in Argentina and elsewhere and claimed the Lebanese diaspora
community at the Triple Frontier as its victims.90 Combined with Argentina’s history of
anti-Arab and Orientalist  attitudes91 more recent  concerns over  terror  and security
accusations soon emerged suggesting that the Triple Frontier was a “hive of activity for
Middle-Eastern ‘terrorist’ groups, which could use the region as a base from which to
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attack.”92 As referenced earlier, this claim got caught up in the U.S.-led global “War on
Terror” and became a talking point for conservative politicians in the United States. 
38 I would also like to suggest that the fears swirling around the Triple Frontier and its
Lebanese-Muslim  community  are  part  of  long-held  American  feelings  about  the
frontier, which have come to influence other regional and national opinions about the
area. As colonists and settlers moved westward across the North American continent
there  emerged  a  complex  consciousness  of  what  the  frontier  entailed.  This
consciousness,  the historian Frederick Jackson Turner argued,93 was the single most
important  factor  in  shaping  a  distinctly  American  character  and  in  differentiating
America  from  its  European  forebears.  The  frontier  — that  contact  zone  between
European  settler  and  wild,  open  land,  of  savages  and  wilderness,  transformed  the
European sentiment and “stripped off the garments of civilization.” The newly minted
American man then transformed the wilderness not with derivative forms of European
civilization, but a new, and distinctly,  American one that was more democratic and
non-authoritarian. Turner’s “Frontier Thesis” and its view of a hopeful, triumphant,
frontier came to dominate American history for decades until challenged by Patricia
Nelson Limerick,94 among others. It also prevailed in popular culture (look no further
than the Canadian series “Little House on the Prairie”) and in U.S. politics.
39 As Turner surmised, with the transcontinental dream and the “Manifest Destiny” of the
United States deemed complete in the conquering of the continental divide it could be
said that the frontier was closed. However, it is also possible that the U.S. has sought
new frontiers through its later acquisitions of colonies and states in the Pacific Rim,
Asia, and the Caribbean. In addition, their efforts against the “communist hordes” of
the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states could be seen as the U.S. turning to other frontiers to
concur or defend in the late twentieth century — including space, the so-called “final
frontier.” During the Cold War frontiers in places where “communism met democracy”
became the crucible for the making or breaking of the “American way.” Part of this
frontier  geography included Latin America where — as mentioned above — the U.S.
involved itself in state politics and supported violent measures to protect its interests
in the region. After the end of the Cold War in the 1990s what frontiers were there left
to conquer, settle, and civilize? The global “War on Terror” could be read as a form of
the “frontier spirit” in American culture and politics. In this view, the Middle East, “the
Muslim World,” and possibly even geographies such as the Triple Frontier area are
imagined as  the new borderlands where American democratic  culture and its  free-
spirit of class consciousness and anti-authoritarianism must settle and tame.
40 There are  parallels  in  how the U.S.  and its  allies  have recast  local  frontiers  in  the
American hemisphere as part of the broader global “War on Terror.” This has produced
an  inordinate  amount  of  fear  and  loathing  about  frontiers  and  “bloody  borders”95
where policy makers, pundits, and wider publics are concerned that Islam is seeping
through  porous  boundaries  and  into  supposedly  Western-Christian  lands.  These
“bloody  borders”  are  found  between  Kenya  and  Somalia,  Indonesia  and  Malaysia,
Turkey and the Balkans. We should also consider the borderlands between Mexico and
the U.S., the liminal islands and landscapes of the Caribbean, and places such as the
Triple Frontier zone as part of this new American “frontier” geography as well. Here
again, U.S. politicians are seeking to extend their supposedly civilizing reach to a place
supposedly  festering with terrorism and anti-American sentiment.  Air  Force Fellow
Curtis Connell referred to the “Tri-Border” area as a “‘wild west’…between Argentina,
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Brazil, and Paraguay,”96 and made clear that the Islamist fund raising he reported was
going on there had a clear "connection to what’s happening in the Middle East” and
required “extra surveillance and increased attention by the U.S. in cooperation with
Latin American partners [to] help control the problem97” and counteract the “loose rule
of law even by Latin American standards” there.98 As referenced earlier, this kind of
“frontier”  framing  and  policy  recommendations  such  as  Connell’s  have  led  some
presidential candidates to invoke the “Monroe Doctrine,” which includes the possibility
of military force in places such as the Triple Frontier if necessary.
 
Conclusion
41 The kind of irrational and prejudicial fear described above in U.S., Latin American, and
Caribbean media,  politics,  and  society  is  often  called  “Islamophobia.”  Islamophobia
emerges  out  of  long-held  biases  against  Muslims  in  the  Americas  and  elsewhere.
“Orientalism,”  Todd Green reminds  us,  “is  the  breeding ground of  Islamophobia.”99
While  both  Orientalism  and  Islamophobia  have  long  plagued  Latin  America,  the
Caribbean, and the Americas as a whole,100 they have grown significantly across the
hemisphere  in  the wake of  9/11 and the subsequent  launch of  the  global  “War on
Terror.” This “war,” with its global reach and blatant breaching of human rights for the
sake of security and safety has fostered a social context in which Islamophobia thrives
across the region. Negative stereotypes about Muslims continue to worsen as the U.S.
and its allies continue to attempt to monitor and neutralize terror threats around the
globe  — including  in  places  such  as  Argentina,  the  Triple  Frontier,  and  Trinidad.
Shaped  by  a  longer  history,101 American  Islamophobia  is  not  produced  by  any  one
politician, party, or country. Nonetheless, the positions taken by American politicians,
think-tanks, and regional bodies have an impact on the local lives of Muslims living in
the Americas — whether they be in Buenos Aires, Port of Spain, or Puerto Iguazu. While
Arabs, Muslims, and others under the spotlight may find economic success, they also
report sentiments of marginalization and suspicion by their fellow citizens. Although
affluent or accepted in some respects,  their place in the societies they call  home is
frequently called into question.
42 Nonetheless,  it  isn’t  just 9/11, ISIS,  Jamaat al-Muslimeen, supposed terrorists in the
borderlands of Latin America, or truck attacks in New York that have made things the
way they are. These concerns represent old anxieties about Islam and Muslims that
have been inherited from the past and have continued to fester in recent years. With all
of this in mind, this paper has tried to explain how the tenuous place of Muslims in
Latin American and Caribbean public spheres must be considered in light of a complex
nexus  of  various  factors  including,  but  not  limited  to,  local  politics  and  public
sentiments, historical events and communities in the region, and the broader context
of the global “War on Terror” and the continuing outsized influence of the U.S. in the
Americas as a whole. It seems that for all that has occurred over the last five centuries
since Muslims first became part of the American story, little has changed. Because of
these various inter-related factors, Muslims in the Americas continue to be received,
perceived, refashioned, integrated (or not) into Latin America, the Caribbean, and the
broader  hemisphere  along old  discourses  of  identity  and difference.  We do well  to
remember that it is a combination of contemporary global and regional fears, politics,
The Global “War on Terror” and the Tenuous Public Space of Muslims in Latin A...
Hamsa, 5 | 2019
15
and rhetoric combined with local and historical factors that play into how Muslims are
so-often tailored, and treated, as the “other” in the Americas and beyond. 
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ABSTRACTS
Surveying several conflicts, conversations, and the convergence of prejudices and fears in the
Americas, this essay explores the linkages between Latin America and the Caribbean and the U.S.
led global “War on Terror.” Examining the parallels in politics, media, and rhetoric in places such
as Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina,  and the U.S.,  this essay examines how Muslims occupy a
tenuous space in Latin American and Caribbean public spheres. Overall, it argues that the place of
Islam and the lives of Muslim communities in the Americas are inherently intertwined with both
local issues of societal concern, social justice, and class and the broader assumptions and far-
reaching frames of U.S. politics and that nation’s leadership in the global “War on Terror.”
Analisando vários conflitos, discussões e a convergência de preconceitos e medos nas Américas,
este ensaio explora as relações entre a América Latina e as Caraíbas e os Estados Unidos, que
levaram à “Guerra ao Terrorismo” global. Examinando o paralelismo na política, nos media e na
retórica, em lugares como Trinidade e Tobago, Argentina e Caraíbas, este artigo analisa como os
muçulmanos ocupam um lugar ténue na esfera pública da América Latina e das Caraíbas.  No
geral,  argumenta  que  a  prática  do  islão  e  as  vidas  das  comunidades  nas  Américas  estão
intrinsecamente entrelaçadas,  tanto com os problemas locais  de preocupação societal,  justiça
social e classe, como com os pressupostos mais amplos e de longo alcance da política dos EUA e da
liderança da nação na “Guerra ao Terrorismo” global.
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